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Abstract
The significant growth of online banking frauds, fueled by the underground
economy of malware, raised the need for effective fraud analysis systems. Un-
fortunately, almost all of the existing approaches adopt black box models and
mechanisms that do not give any justifications to analysts. Also, the develop-
ment of such methods is stifled by limited Internet banking data availability for
the scientific community. In this paper we describe BankSealer, a decision
support system for online banking fraud analysis and investigation. During a
training phase, BankSealer builds easy-to-understand models for each cus-
tomer’s spending habits, based on past transactions. First, it quantifies the
anomaly of each transaction with respect to the customer historical profile. Sec-
ond, it finds global clusters of customers with similar spending habits. Third,
it uses a temporal threshold system that measures the anomaly of the current
spending pattern of each customer, with respect to his or her past spending be-
havior. With this threefold profiling approach, it mitigates the under-training
due to the lack of historical data for building well-trained profiles, and the evo-
lution of users’ spending habits over time. At runtime, BankSealer supports
analysts by ranking new transactions that deviate from the learned profiles, with
an output that has an easily understandable, immediate statistical meaning.
Our evaluation on real data, based on fraud scenarios built in collaboration
with domain experts that replicate typical, real-world attacks (e.g., credential
stealing, banking trojan activity, and frauds repeated over time), shows that
our approach correctly ranks complex frauds. In particular, we measure the
effectiveness, the computational resource requirements and the capabilities of
BankSealer to mitigate the problem of users that performed a low number of
transactions. Our system ranks frauds and anomalies with up to 98% detection
rate and with a maximum daily computation time of 4 minutes. Given the
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good results, a leading Italian bank deployed a version of BankSealer in their
environment to analyze frauds.
Keywords: Internet Banking, Fraud Detection, User Profiling, Decision
Support System
1. Introduction
The popularity of Internet banking has led to an increase of frauds, perpe-
trated through cyber attacks, phishing scams and malware campaigns, resulting
in substantial financial losses [1, 2]. In 2013, Kaspersky Lab1 detected 28.4 mil-
lion attacks using financial malware, with a 27.6% increase over 2012. The5
number of users targeted in attacks involving financial malware also rose by
18.6% to 3.8 million. A similar trend characterizes online banking frauds which
increased 30% in 2012– 2013. 2
Internet banking frauds are difficult to analyze and detect because the fraud-
ulent behavior is dynamic, spread across different customer profiles, and dis-10
persed in large and highly imbalanced datasets (e.g., web logs, transaction logs,
spending profiles). Despite the importance of the problem, the development
of new online banking fraud decision support systems is made difficult by the
limited availability of transactions and fraud datasets, due to privacy concerns.
As a consequence, only a limited amount of research deals with fraud detec-15
tion in online banking. Commercial systems do exist, but they offer limited
insight in their inner workings due to obvious intellectual property concerns.
We noticed that most existing approaches build black box models that are not
very insightful for analysts in the subsequent manual investigations, making the
process less efficient. In addition, systems based on baseline profiling are not20
adaptive, and do not take into account cultural and behavioral differences that
vary from country to country. Instead of focusing on pure detection approaches,
we believe that more research efforts are needed toward systems that support
investigations. Cooperating with a leading security company which helps banks
build fraud detection systems and processes, we had the unique opportunity to25
work on a real-world, anonymized dataset of Internet banking transactions.
In this paper we present a detailed description of BankSealer [3], a de-
cision support system for online banking fraud analysis and investigation that
automatically ranks frauds and anomalies in transactions. Most of the devel-
opment was driven by the analysis of the dataset itself. BankSealer uses a30
combination of advanced data mining, statistical, and mathematical techniques
to automatically rank transactions on the basis of the risk of being fraudulent.
During a training phase, it builds a local, global, and temporal profile for each
user. The local profile models past user behavior to evaluate the anomaly of
new transactions by means of a novel algorithm that uses the Histogram Based35
1Kaspersky Lab - Financial cyber threats in 2013 - Available at http://goo.gl/8iaDcU
2Symantec - Internet security threat Report 2013 - Available at http://goo.gl/hDgafz
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Outlier Score (HBOS). The global profiling clusters users according to their
transactions features via an iterative version of Density-Based Spatial Cluster-
ing of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN), and compute the anomaly with the
Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF). The temporal profile aims to
model transactions in terms of time-dependent attributes. For this, we design40
a series of thresholds and measure the anomaly in terms of the percentage gap
from the thresholds once they are exceeded. We handle the concept drift of the
scores with an exponential decay function that assigns lower weights to older
profiles.
We tested the BankSealer on real-world data, injecting a realistic set of45
attacks (e.g., credential stealing, banking trojan activity, and frauds repeated
over time) built in collaboration with domain experts. Our system ranked fraud
and anomalies with up to 98% detection rate.
In summary, our main contributions are:
1. An in-depth analysis of a real-world online banking dataset, in which we50
highlight the aforementioned challenges and the importance of dealing
with dataset scarcity in this research field.
2. A general framework for online semi-supervised outlier-detection based
on a combination of different models to discover different types of frauds.
Our approach have a score with a clear statistical meaning, is adaptive to55
non-stationary sources and can deal with concept drift and data scarcity.
3. An almost exhaustive evaluation through a set of realistic attacks and in
a real-world setting, thanks to the deployment to a large national bank.
2. Online Banking Fraud Detection: Goals and Challenges
Our goal is to support the analysis of (novel) frauds and anomalies. Hence,60
we do not want to focus on a classifier but provide the analysts with a ranked
list of transactions, along with the risk score. The rationale behind this design
decision is that analysts must investigate reported alerts in any case: there-
fore, the focus is on collecting and correctly ranking evidence that support the
analysis of fraudulent behavior, rather than just flagging transactions.65
From a literature review (described in §6) and a real- world dataset obtained
from a large national bank (described in §3), we found peculiar characteristics
that make the analysis of this data particularly challenging. First and foremost,
the distribution of attributes values is imbalanced and skewed (non-symmetric),
which makes it difficult to approximate with most common statistical distribu-70
tions, and unusable with most statistical methods to explain or predict trends
and outliers. A second troublesome characteristic is the prevalence of users who
perform a low number of transactions—an issue not considered in previous lit-
erature. Finally, the system must adopt a simple design and must be able to
handle the high load of transactions avoiding high computational and spatial75
complexity.
Given the scarcity of labeled datasets, such a system must be able to work
in an unsupervised or semi-supervised fashion (we can assume that no fraud
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Table 1: Number of transactions, customers and attributes for each type of transaction.
Attributes in bold are hashed for anonymity needs.
Dataset Attributes Users Transactions
Bank Transfers Amount, CC ASN, IP, IBAN, IBAN CC,
Timestamp
92,653 718,927
Phone recharges Amount, CC ASN, IP, Phone operator,
Phone number, Timestamp
29,298 100,688
Prepaid Cards Amount, Card type, Card number,
CC ASN, IP, Timestamp
16,814 71,362
exists in this dataset, as indicated by our collaborators). This conflicts with
the requirement of the system being able to provide “readable” evidence to80
corroborate each alert. These peculiarities have remarkable implications for the
typical statistical and data mining methods used in the outlier detection field.
3. Dataset Analysis
Our system design is guided by an in-depth analysis of a real-world dataset,
that is paramount for our work and provides useful insights for future research.85
3.1. Dataset Description
We obtained a dataset of transactions from a large national bank, collected
between December 2012 and August 2013. The dataset was anonymized by re-
moving personally identifiable information, and substituting it with randomly-
generated unique values to ensure our analysis could still link values that hap-90
pened to be equal.
The data contains customer transactions related to Bank transfers (i.e.,
money transfers from any account of the bank to any other account), Prepaid
cards (i.e., transactions to top up credit on prepaid cards) Phone Recharges
(i.e., transaction to refill prepaid cellphone accounts).95
Table 1 summarizes the number of transactions and customers involved.
The selection of relevant features is a particularly important step. Beyond
the obvious ones (such as Amount, IP address of the customer, and Times-
tamp of the transaction), we selected the following attributes, based on a pre-
liminary analysis of data:100
• CC ASN: the country from which the customer makes their connection,
based on the Autonomous System
• UserID: unique ID associated to a user.
• IBAN, IBAN CC: the identifier of the beneficiary account, and country
• Card type (i.e., the circuit), and number of the prepaid card.105
• Phone operator, and number of the beneficiary of the top-up.
4
Figure 1: Distribution of the transaction amounts
Figure 2: Discretization of amount distribution
3.2. Attribute Distribution
To measure the quality of the dataset and of attributes, we make an ex-
ploratory analysis on their values. We show the results on the bank transfer
data for brevity, but similar results are obtained for the other contexts.110
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of the transaction amounts. We can see that
the majority of transactions has low amounts, and that there are peaks at
“round” amounts. Initially, we decide to discretize numerical attributes using
a standard equi-frequency binning technique. However, the last bin covers a
very large range of values, due to the distribution being long-tailed. This does115
not allow us to discriminate between spending pattern. Thus, we decide to
“break down” the last bin by re-applying the same technique, producing the
binning shown in Fig. 2. This static binning is necessary due to the fact that
our approach allows the updating of the model for handling the concept drift.
If we observe the distribution of the transactions over the hours of each day,120
the majority of the operations are executed during working hours. We apply a
discretization to transform such timestamps in a categorical value, by splitting
the day in early morning, morning, afternoon, evening, and night, as shown in
Fig. 3.
In general, we observe that common attributes to the online banking services125
under analysis (i.e., Amount, IP, Timestamp), show a strongly skewed and
imbalanced distribution. In addition, the majority of categorical attributes have
an irregular and noisy trend with a high cardinality associated to a few values.
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Figure 3: Discretization of the number of transaction per day
We notice a striking dissimilarity between bank-wise vs. user-wise attribute
distributions. When analyze globally (i.e., bank-wise), certain attributes exhibit130
uniform distributions; when analyzed locally (i.e., user-wise), the very same
attributes show an imbalanced, skewed distribution, often with more than one
modality. This motivates our approach in building user based profile (see § 4).
A challenging aspect is the abundance of users who perform few transactions,
insufficient to build user profiles in a reasonable time frame. Unfortunately, none135
of the previous works in the area addresses this problem.
3.3. Correlation and Dependence Analysis
We determine to what extent features are directly correlated or dependent
on each other. Attributes that share the same information (e.g., Phone operator
and Phone number) and attributes derived from computations (e.g., ASN from140
IP) are obviously correlated. Apart from these, computing correlation on non
homogeneous values requires us to use approximated methods [4]. In particular,
we use the point biserial rpb methods to study the correlation between quantita-
tive attributes (e.g., ”Amount”) and the categorical ones (CC ASN, IBAN CC,
etc). For the correlation between categorical attributes, we use the Kendall-tau145
rank correlation coefficient and the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, by
sorting the analysed attributes according to the frequency of each value in the
dataset.
We obtain values near to zero for all coefficients and, hence, the features
under analysis can be considered not to be directly correlated.150
To study dependence, we evaluate non parametric tests (for a general overview
see [5]). Pearson’s χ2 test for independence, for instance, has a pre-requisite of
the contingency matrix having at least 80% of cells with more than five observa-
tions. However, in our case the contingency matrix has more than 50% of cells
with no observations, due to the very high degree of freedom of the cardinality155
of our attributes. For the same reason, it is impossible to apply Yate’s continu-
ity correction factor. Fisher’s exact test, which is based on the hypergeometric
distribution and does not suffer the limitations of Pearson’s χ2 test, is computa-
tionally unfeasible for matrices with high dimensionality and sparsity. Finally,
the mutual information test (or G-test), which measures how much knowing one160
random variable gives information about another random variable, also requires
the contingency matrix to have no null values.
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Figure 4: PCA of the dataset on two dimensions
In conclusion, it is not easy to estimate the dependence and the correlation
between the attributes. The main obstacle is represented by the extremely
sparse, imbalanced distribution of the dataset and by the high cardinality of165
the attributes. However, in the light of the obtained results, we decide to
work under the hypothesis of independent and uncorrelated attributes. This
approximation allows a much easier visualization and interpretation of models
and results, on the top of a reduced temporal and spatial complexity.
3.4. Clustering Analysis170
We want to evaluate the feasibility of finding “classes” of users and quanti-
fying the similarity between profiles in order to separate anomalous users from
normal ones. In Fig. 4 we show the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on
two dimensions that we have applied to the users profiles. As it can be seen,
they do not seem to form distinct groups. Instead, they tend to congregate in175
one dense cloud of points, with several outliers points and small groups around
it. The results are confirmed by the application of the Hopkins’ statistic [6],
which measures the clustering tendency. It is clear from the first results that
cluster users is not an easy task, because of the homogeneity of users’ behavior.
Despite the discouraging results of the PCA, clustering the profiles using a180
basic agglomerative hierarchical clustering led to a satisfactory outcome. After
testing the Euclidean distance, we switch to the Mahalanobis distance [7] which
operates with scale-invariant datasets. This means that it manages the differ-
ences of scale between the components of the vector representing the profile.
In Fig. 5 we present the dendrograms relative to the application of the hier-185
archical clustering algorithm. The vertical axes expresses the linkage (measure
of similarity) at which elements are joined: the lower the linkage, the more
similar they are. As it can be seen, there are a lot of elements joined with a
high similarity. These elements compose the large cluster of very similar profiles
observed before. Hence, the majority of users yield densely “connected” areas190
of the dendogram. On the other hand, users with rare spending profiles tend
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Figure 5: Dendrogram representing the hierarchical clustering using the Mahalanobis distance.
The different colors represent the clusters obtained cutting dendrograms at 75% linkage.
to form small, isolated groups. These aspects simplify the outlier detection of
anomalous users, yet do not create a sharp distinction between users.
In order to exploit the different zones of density of the large cluster, we apply
DBSCAN [8], which is a density-based clustering algorithm: it grows regions195
with sufficiently high density into clusters, defined as maximal sets of density-
connected points, and discovers clusters of arbitrary shape in spatial databases
with noise. We execute several iterations of the DBSCAN algorithm, varying
the ε parameter which indicates the maximum distance from a point within
which we can consider another point density connected to it. We observe that200
for low values of ε, we discover only the clusters closer to the center of our data
group, while all the external data points are considered noise. For higher values,
we find groups for the external data points, while the major group of our data
is considered a single huge cluster. By manual inspection, we verify that the
generated clusters are reasonable (i.e. composed by similar users). For these205
reasons, we design a variant of the DBSCAN algorithm (explained in § 4.2)
which tries to separate zones with different density in the big cluster of data by
executing multiple iterations of DBSCAN, using increasing ε values.
To evaluate the quality of this clustering and to find a stopping criterion we
use the Davies-Bouldin index [9]. A low value means good clustering quality210
(i.e., high intra-cluster similarity and low inter-cluster similarity). In Fig. 6 we
show the trend of the Davis-Bouldin index, as the number of clusters and the
ε parameter vary. As the number of cluster grows, the index has an increasing
trend, reaches a global maximum and then decreases. In other terms , we have
good clustering results either with just a few clusters, or with many clusters.215
On the right hand side, the lowest value of the index is where we have a high
value of the ε parameter and, hence, one large cluster and a few anomaly points
or small clusters around it. We obtain the same results applying the Dunn
index [10], which verify the quality of clusters in terms of the ratio between the
minimal inter-cluster distance to maximal intra- cluster distance.220
In order to understand if user behavior can be modeled, and to give an
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explanation to clustering results, we analyze the data trying to extract any
underlying distribution, by performing the Anderson-Darling best fitting test for
normal, exponential, extreme value, log-normal, and Weibull distributions [11],
using the variant for multivariate distributions. In spite of all our efforts, we225
were not able to detect any of the aforementioned distributions that can describe
the behavior of users. It explains the complexity of finding clear categories.
4. Approach and System Description
In this section we describe the main features of BankSealer (for techni-
cal details see [3]), a general framework for online banking fraud and anomaly230
detection that synthesizes relevant information for each user and transaction.
The objective of our system is to be a Decision Support System, able to im-
prove the speed and accuracy of the detection of frauds by the bank analysts
characterizing the users of the online banking web application by means of a
local, a global and a temporal profile, which are built during a training phase.235
As depicted in Fig. 7, the training phase takes as input a list of transactions.
Each type of profile extracts different statistical features from the transaction
attributes, according to the type of model built. BankSealer works both un-
der semi- supervised and unsupervised assumptions and once the profiles are
built, it processes new transactions and ranks them according to their anomaly240
score and the predicted risk of fraud. The anomaly score quantifies the statisti-
cal likelihood of a transaction being a fraud w.r.t. the learned profiles. The risk
of fraud prioritizes the transactions by means of anomaly score and amount.
4.1. Local Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to characterize each user’s spending patterns.245
During training, we aggregate the transactions by user and approximate
each feature distribution by a histogram. More precisely, we calculate the em-
pirical marginal distribution of the features of each user’s transactions. This
representation is simple, readable and effective.
At runtime, we calculate the anomaly score of each new transaction using250
the HBOS [12] method. The HBOS computes the probability of a transaction
Figure 6: Application of the Davis-Bouldin index on the as the number of clusters grows (left)
and as the ε parameter varies (right)
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Figure 7: BankSealer architecture.
according to the marginal distribution learned. We improve the HBOS to ac-
count for the variance of each feature and to allow the analyst to weight the
features differently according to the institution’s priorities.
Training and Feature Extraction. The features are the actual values of255
all the attributes listed in Tab. 1. During training we estimate the marginal
distribution of each feature using uni-variate histograms. However, we do not
consider correlation between features in order to gain lower spatial complexity
and better readability of the histograms. Uni-variate histograms are indeed
directly readable by analysts who get a clear idea of the typical behavior by260
simply looking at the profile. In addition, they easily allow to compute the
anomaly score as the sum of the contributions of each feature, giving an intuitive
justification of the resulting anomaly score. For categorical attributes (e.g., IP,
CC), we count the occurrences of each category. For numerical attributes (e.g.,
Amount, timestamp) we adopt a static binning and count how many values265
falls inside each bin. After this, we estimate the marginal distribution of the
features, computing the relative frequency.
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. We score each new transac-
tion using HBOS [12]. It considers the relative frequency of each bin to quantify
the log-likelihood of the transaction to be drawn from the marginal distribution.270
In other words, for each feature ti of the transaction t we calculate log
1
histi(ti)
,
where histi indicates the frequency of the i-th feature. The resulting values are
summed to form the anomaly score HBOSi(t). Finally, we compute the risk of
fraud multiplying the anomaly score by the transaction amount.
Feature Normalization, Weighting and Rare Values. One of the main275
drawbacks of the original HBOS is that it does not take into account the variance
of the features: we apply a min-max normalization to the histogram, where the
minimum is zero, and the maximum is the highest bin.
In addition, we add a weighting coefficient wi to each feature to allow the
analyst to tune the system according to the institution’s priorities. In our280
experiments, however, we fix all the weights at 1, except for IP and IBAN,
which are fixed at 0.5 because of their high variance.
To mitigate the problem of feature values never occurred during training for
a user (i.e., zero frequency within the local profile),we compute the frequency of
unseen values as k/1−f , where f is the frequency of that value calculated within285
a particular cluster, if the global profiling is able to find a cluster for that user.
Otherwise, f is calculated on the entire dataset. This method quantifies the
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“rarity” of a feature value with respect to the global knowledge. The parameter
k is an arbitrarily small, non-zero number. In our experiments we set it to 0.01.
Under-trained and New Users. An under-trained user is a user that290
performed a low number of transactions. In BankSealer this value is a pa-
rameter, which empirically we set at T = 3 as this is enough to get rid of most
of the false positives due to under-training. For under-trained users, we con-
sider their global profile (see §4.2) and select a cluster of similar users. For each
incoming transaction, our system calculates the anomaly score using the local295
profile of both the under-trained user and the k nearest neighbor users. For
new users, we adopt the same strategy. However, given the absence of a global
profile, we consider all the users as neighbors.
4.2. Global Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to characterize “classes” of spending patterns.300
During training, we first create a global profile for each user and then cluster
the resulting profiles using an iterative version of the DBSCAN. Finally, for
each global profile we compute the CBLOF score, which tells the analyst to
what extent a profile is anomalous with respect to its closest cluster. The global
profile is also leveraged to find local profiles for under- trained or new users. The305
rationale is that users belonging to the same cluster exhibit spending patterns
with similar local profiles.
Training and Feature Extraction. Each user is represented as a feature
vector of the six components: average transaction amount, sum of the trans-
action amounts, average timespan between consecutive transactions, number of310
transaction executed from foreign countries, number of transaction whose ben-
eficiary account is in a foreign country (only for bank transfers), number of
transaction executed.
To find classes of users with similar spending patterns, we apply an iterative
version of the DBSCAN, using the Mahalanobis distance between the aforemen-315
tioned vectors. To mitigate the drawbacks of the classic DBSCAN when applied
to skewed and imbalanced datasets such as ours, we run 10 iterations for de-
creasing values of ε, which is the maximum distance to consider two users as
connected (i.e., density similar). At each iteration, we select the largest cluster
and apply DBSCAN to its points with the next value of ε. The smaller clusters320
at each iterations are preserved. We stop the iterations whenever the number
of clusters exhibits an abrupt increase (i.e., a knee). In all of our experiments,
we empirically observed that this happens at 0.2. As a result, we obtain a set
of clusters, which contain similar user profiles.
Anomaly Score Calculation. The global profile is used to assign each325
user profile a global anomaly score, which tells the analyst how “uncommon”
their spending pattern is. For this, we compute the unweighted-CBLOF [13]
score, which compute the anomaly as the minimum distance of a user profile
from the centroid of the nearest largest cluster, considering small clusters as
outliers with respect to large clusters: the more a user profile deviates from the330
dense cluster of “normal” users, the higher the anomaly score will be.
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4.3. Temporal Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to deal with frauds that exploit the repetition of
legitimate-looking transactions over time. We construct a temporal profile for
each user having a sufficient amount of past transactions, because occasional335
transactions have a high variance, unsuitable for this kind of analysis. We use
a time window, which size can be easily chosen given the hardware resources
available (see §5). Within such time window, during training, we aggregate
the transactions of each user over time with a daily sampling frequency and
calculate the sample mean and variance of the numerical features. These are340
used as thresholds during runtime to calculate the anomaly score.
Training and Feature Extraction. For each user, we extract the fol-
lowing aggregated features: total amount, total and maximum daily number of
transactions. During training, we compute the mean and standard deviation for
each feature, and set a threshold at mean plus standard deviation.345
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. At runtime, for each user
and according to the sampling frequency, we calculate the cumulative value for
each of the aforementioned features. Then, we sum the positive delta between
each cumulative value and the respective threshold to form the anomaly score.
4.4. Profile Updating350
We update the profiles and scores using an exponential discount factor, ex-
pressed in terms of a time window W and its respective sampling frequency.
Every month we recursively count the values of the features in the previous
months discounted by a factor λ = e−τ/W , where W ∼ 1 year. The rationale
is that business activities are typically carried out, throughout a year, with a355
monthly basis. The parameter τ/W influences the speed with which the expo-
nential decay forgets past data. We empirically set τ = 5, because it seems to
best discount past data with respect to time and sampling windows.
5. Experimental Evaluation
The goals of our evaluation is to measure (1) the effectiveness and (2)360
the computational resource requirements of BankSealer in correctly rank-
ing fraudulent transactions never seen before. With respect to [3], we repeated
the experimental evaluation on a larger dataset, using mixed fraud scenarios to
provide further empirical evidence of the viability of our approach. In addition,
we provide more details on the effectiveness of our system.365
5.1. Dataset Description and Fraud Scenarios
In order to build a more consistent model and to reduce the noise due to
under- trained and new users, we consider a larger dataset than the one used
in [3], by considering 9 months of data collected between December and August
2013: we use the firsts months for training, and the last month for testing.370
The dataset (described in Section 3) is unlabeled, but it contains no known
frauds, as confirmed by the bank. As shown in Table 1, it consists of 718,927
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Table 2: Amount transferred for each dataset and scenario. For the bank transfers dataset,
the money can be transferred to a national or foreign account, whereas for the phone recharges
and prepaid debit cards the money is charged on card.
Fraud scenario Amount transferred (e)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
1: Information Stealing 10,000–50,000 250–255 750–1,000
2: Transaction Hijacking 10,000–50,000 250–255 750–1,000
3: Stealthy Fraud very low amount 50–100 5–10 50–100
low amount 100–500 10–25 100–250
medium amount 500–1,000 25–50 250–500
bank transfers (92,653 users), 71,362 prepaid cards transactions (16,814 users),
and 100,688 phone recharge (29,298 users) transactions.
As explained in [3], the evaluation of BankSealer is particularly diffi-375
cult because, like any unsupervised analysis tool, it produces novel knowledge.
Therefore, we rely on the expertise of domain experts (bank operators) to enrich
our testing dataset with synthetic frauds based on fraud scenarios that replicate
the typical real attacks performed against online banking users. We focus on
the most important and challenging fraud schemes nowadays, those driven by380
banking trojans (e.g., ZeuS, Citadel) or phishing. Table 2 shows the amounts
for each dataset and scenario.
Scenario 1: Info stealing. The trojan modifies the login form to deceive
the victim into entering an one time password (OTP) along with the login
credentials. This information is use by the fraudster to execute a transaction385
(with a high amount) towards a his account, where the victim never sent money
to. We test both the case of the connection coming from a national and foreign
IP address. To inject the fraud, we randomly choose a victim from the testing
dataset and used a random timestamp for the transaction.
Scenario 2: Transaction Hijacking. The trojan, not the fraudster, hi-390
jacks a legitimate bank transfer by manipulating the victim’s browser. The
challenge is that the connection comes from the victim’s computer and IP ad-
dress. Moreover, we execute the fraudulent transaction within ten minutes from
a real one, to emulate a session hijacking.
Scenario 3: Stealthy Fraud. The strategy of the fraudster is to execute a395
series of low–medium amount transactions, repeated daily for one month during
working hours, to better blend in. We analyze three cases (very low, low and
medium daily amounts). We use the same number of users of the previous
scenarios, each performing 30 fraudulent transaction.
Mixed Scenarios: Information stealing and Transaction Hijacking400
In addition to considering each scenario independently (as done in [3]), we eval-
uate BankSealer with respect to frauds evenly generated from the first two
scenarios to provide a more realistic analysis and to give an empirical evidence
of the feasibility of our approach.
5.2. Evaluation Approach and Metrics405
For the evaluation we followed the same criteria described in [3]. After
training, we inject n fraudulent transactions in the testing dataset. Then, we
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Figure 8: True positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) for n ∈ [1, N ], where N
is the size of the testing dataset. The label “UT” stands for “under-training”, “L” for local
profile, and “T” for temporal profile. BankSealer shows similar performances in Scenario
1, 2, and mixed, with an high detection rate for low value of n ( ∼ 90%). Scenario 3 is the
most challenging and reach, thanks to the temporal profile, a detection rate of 74%
use the local profiles to rank transactions, and the temporal profiles to rank
users, according to the respective anomaly scores. The global profiles are used
to mitigate under-training. We analyze the top n transactions (or users) in the410
ranking, where n is the number of injected transactions (or users). In our case,
n accounts for 1% of the testing dataset. Depending on the specific scenario,
a fraud may trigger either the local or temporal profile, or both. We count
as true positives the number of fraudulent transactions (or users) in the top n
positions, and the remainder ones (to the whole n) are false positives. All test415
are repeated 10 times and the results are averaged, to avoid biases.
The overall results, summarized in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, are consistent with
the ones obtained in [3], with BankSealer outperforming the state of the
art. For instance, [1] detects up to 60–70% of the frauds with an unreported
precision. Remarkably, the effect of under-training is almost negligible.420
Experiment 1: Well-trained Users. We first test BankSealer without
the noise due to non well-trained users.
As Tab. 3 shows, the combination of local and temporal profiles guaran-
tees that frauds are ranked high at either transaction level, thanks to the local
profiles, or user level, thanks to the temporal profile.425
The results on the information stealing frauds (Scenario 1) are very promis-
ing. In fact, BankSealer reach a detection rate of 98%, 95%, and 91% and
a precision of 97.6%, 94.7%, and 90.7% in the bank transfer, phone recharges,
and prepaid cards dataset respectively.
Transaction hijacking frauds (Scenario 2) are particularly challenging, be-430
cause the malware does not alter the overall amount of transactions performed:
It leverages existing transactions by diverting them to a different recipient. The
IP address is one of those usually used and, in the case where the recipient fraud-
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Figure 9: Precision for n ∈ [1, N ], where N is the size of the testing dataset. The label “UT”
stands for “under-training”, “L” for local profile, and “T” for temporal profile. BankSealer
shows high precision in Scenario 1, 2, and mixed for low value of n ( ∼ 90%). The temporal
profile improves the overall effectiveness in Scenario 3 up to 80% of precision.
ulent account is national, these transactions blend in quite easily. However, even
for this last case, thanks to the temporal profile anomaly score BankSealer435
correctly ranks 59% of the frauds, up to 80% with 77.6% of precision for bank
transfer dataset.
Stealthy frauds (Scenario 3) are also challenging: the local profile performs
well when the recipient account is foreign, or with phone recharge and prepaid
card frauds. Interestingly, stealthy frauds involving very low amounts (50–100e)440
are correctly ranked better than transactions involving low amounts (100–500e).
The reason is because the very-low amounts are rarer in the dataset, and thus
obtain higher anomaly scores. In this scenario, thanks to the temporal profil-
ing,BankSealer correctly ranks up to 74% of the frauds ( 74.9% of precision)
for bank transfer dataset , 100% ( 99.8% of precision) for the phone recharges445
dataset, and 93% (92.9% of precision) for the prepaid cards dataset .
As expected, in Mixed scenarios BankSealer try to mediate the good
performances obtained in scenario 1 with the lower detection rate obtained in
scenario 2 reaching a true positive rate near 80%.
Experiment 2: Under-trained and New Users. We evaluate the ca-450
pabilities of the global profile to lookup a good replacement local profile for
under-trained and new users. We proceed similarly to what we did in the pre-
vious experiment, injecting 1% of fraudulent transactions, but we spread the
injections evenly across well trained, under- trained, and new users.
Tab. 4 summarizes the percentage of correctly ranked transactions overall,455
for well-trained users only, for under-trained uses only, and finally for new users
only. Performance is similar to the previous experiment, even if the percentage
of correctly ranked frauds are obviously lower due to the additional noise.
The fact that under-trained sometimes obtain better ranking than well-
trained users, especially when in the attack scenario the frauds are masked to460
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Table 3: Experiment 1 results on transactions and users. Blank cells indicate inapplica-
ble dataset-scenario combinations (e.g., phone recharge transactions have no IBAN, phone
recharge or prepaid card transactions are only nation-wise).
Fraud scenario Correctly ranked frauds (%)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
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1: Information Stealing foreign IP, IBAN 98 61 95 56 90 30
foreign IP, national IBAN 92 61
national IP, foreign IBAN 98 60 93 62 91 30
national IP and IBAN 91 63
2: Transaction Hijacking foreign 80 59
national 28 59 70 71 60 33
3: Stealthy Fraud foreign, very low amount 70 67
foreign, low amount 69 69
foreign, medium amount 71 73
national, very low amount 40 64 82 99 77 88
national, low amount 37 72 82 99 74 88
national, medium amount 40 74 83 100 82 93
Mixed Frauds national/foreign 83 62 84 58 76 30
national 70 63 81 63 70 28
be similar to common transactions, is an artifact due to the fact that in under-
trained users’ profiles even frauds designed to appear as legitimate transactions
can receive a high score if the (few) transactions already observed for them are
very different from the injected ones. Frauds injected in new users, instead,
are ranked incorrectly when are designed to be similar to legitimate transac-465
tions. This is due to the fact that, for new users, transactions are tested against
the average profile of all transactions in the dataset, and thus transaction with
common attributes will receive low scores. In the experiments on the phone
recharges and prepaid card dataset, we obtain a lower percentage of correctly
ranked frauds than those in Tab. 3. On the other hand, for the stealthy fraud470
(Scenario 3) the percentages are considerably lower. A factor is the huge
number of under-trained users in these two datasets.
Experiment 3: Performance and Resource Requirements. To test
the performance of BankSealer, we measured both the computational re-
quirements at runtime (as this is a constraint for the practical use of the system475
in production), and peak memory requirements at training time (as this is a
constraint on the dimension of the dataset that can be handled).
For computational power requirements, we test the time to analyze one day
and one month of data, both with and without the handling of under-trained and
new users explained in §4.1. Our experiments have been executed on a desktop-480
class machine with a quad-core, 3.40Ghz Intel i5-3570 CPU, 16GB of RAM,
running Linux 3.7.10 x86 64. Processing times are taken using the time library.
The results are listed in Tab. 5 . As we can see, the processing time varies on the
basis of the context being tested, and there is a significant difference induced
by the handling of the bank transfer dataset and under-trained/new users. In485
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Table 4: Experiment 2 results on well-trained, under-trained, new users only, and overall. As
in Tab. 3, blank cells indicate inapplicable dataset-scenario combinations.
Fraud scenario Correctly ranked frauds (%)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
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1: Information Stealing foreign IP, IBAN 96 96 99 93 71 81 95 11 65 67 80 0
foreign IP, national IBAN 75 81 91 52
national IP, foreign IBAN 95 98 100 85 59 81 95 0 69 71 77 0
national IP and IBAN 72 84 93 42
2: Transaction Hijacking foreign 65 46 90 60
national 25 17 61 3 22 13 51 0 30 18 64 0
3: Stealthy Fraud foreign, very low amount 59 44 90 44
foreign, low amount 68 39 91 60
foreign, medium amount 68 42 93 70
national, very low amount 31 20 72 5 35 39 72 3 46 40 93 0
national, low amount 31 28 70 3 36 41 36 0 47 35 98 35
national, medium amount 35 25 74 7 39 35 81 1 60 53 92 5
Mixed Frauds national/foreign 71 73 85 58 50 60 84 8 32 33 63 0
national 60 67 76 43 43 48 58 3 26 26 44 0
Table 5: Computation time required at runtime under various conditions. In the typical use
case, the system works on a daily basis, thus requiring 6 minutes (worst case).
Testing interval Elapsed time
Bank transfers Phone recharge Prepaid cards
1 day, no under-trained/new 1′00′′ 0′18′′ 0′07′′
1 day, under-trained/new 4′00′′ 0′24′′ 0′10′′
1 month, no under-trained/new 6′00′′ 0′30′′ 0′12′′
1 month, under-trained/new 93′00′′ 2′30′′ 1′00′′
production BankSealer will analyze transactions day by day. Therefore, the
maximum time required would be 4 minutes per day for the bank transfers
context. In conclusion, BankSealer is suitable for online fraud monitoring.
We test the scalability of the system by measuring RAM consumption at
training time, which is the most memory-intensive phase. We use the bank490
transfers dataset, the largest one. We rely on memory-profiler and psutil. As
Fig. 10 shows, the peak RAM consumption increases almost linearly with the
number of days, and quadratically with the number of users. This is expected,
as the most memory-intensive data structure is the distance matrix, a square
matrix of the size of the number of users.495
6. Related Work and Discussion
Fraud detection, mainly focused on credit card fraud, is a wide research
topic, for which we refer the reader to [14, 15, 2].
Limiting our review to the field to banking fraud detection, supervised ap-
proaches based on contrast patterns and contrast sets (e.g., [16]) have been500
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Figure 10: RAM requirements for increasing values of W and users profiled (left) Time re-
quirements for runtime analysis of different testing interval.
applied. Along a similar line [17] proposed a rule-based Internet banking fraud
detection system. The proposed technique does not work in real time and thus
is profoundly different from ours. Also, supervised techniques require labeled
samples, differently from BankSealer.
The unsupervised approach presented in [1] is interesting as it mitigates the505
shortcomings of contrast pattern mining by considering the dependence between
events at different points in time. However, [1] deals with the logs of the online
banking web application, and thus does not detect frauds as much as irregular
interactions with the application. Among the unsupervised learning methods,
[18] proposed an effective detection mechanism to identify legitimate users and510
trace their unlawful activities using Hidden Markov Model (HMM)s. [19] is
based on an unsupervised modeling of local and global observations of users’
behavior, and relies on differential analysis to detect frauds as deviations from
normal behavior. This evidence is strengthened or weakened by the users’ global
behavior. The major drawback of this approach is that the data collection must515
happen on the client side, which makes it cumbersome to deploy in large, real-
world scenarios. In general, a major difference between existing unsupervised
and semi-supervised approaches and BankSealer is that they do not give the
analyst a motivation for the analysis results, making manual investigation and
confirmation more difficult.520
The main barrier in this research field is the lack of publicly available, real-
world frauds and a ground truth for validation. Indeed, we had to resort to
synthetically generated frauds. The absence of non-anonymized text fields does
not allow us to analyze, for instance, their semantics. In future extensions,
BankSealer will compute the models on the bank side and export privacy-525
preserving statistics for evaluation.
The prototype is also constrained by the RAM consumption of the cluster-
ing phase. This technical limitation can be mitigated by applying a distribute
version of presented algorithms.
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7. Conclusions530
BankSealer is an effective online banking semi-supervised and unsuper-
vised fraud and anomaly detection approach that helps the analyst in under-
standing the reasons behind fraud alerts. We developed it based on real-world
(albeit anonymized) data and requirements.
We performed an in-depth technical analysis of the dataset, which allowed us535
to understand its main features, to generalize them and to developBankSealer
in a data-driven way. This allowed us to mitigate challenges such as the scarcity
of training data and their extreme statistical imbalance.
We evaluated the developed system through real-world data and a set of
realistic attacks, validated by domain experts.540
BankSealer is currently deployed as a pilot project in the large national
bank with which we cooperated in building it. Thanks to the data we are
receiving and recording from this deployment, a short-term future development
is to consider the feedback given by the analyst on the detected anomalies to
improve the results.545
Other future expansions are a semantic analysis of the text attributes, and
a more precise estimation of the number of transactions required to fully train
a profile.
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